Chromatix wrote:
...thinking, at least theoretically, about how to built voting machines that could actually be trustworthy. That means they have to be...auditable from the hardware level upwards. A 6502-based system could be a good basis for that, since everything is big and crude enough to examine on an airport-grade X-ray machine and the source code would be small enough to examine by hand, but the number of programmable devices embedded in it would have to be strictly minimised. A GAL chip or a PIC stuck in the middle of the bootstrap process would be a giant red flag.
This is indeed a thing. See Princeton's
Vintage Verification project for use of 6502-based machines for nuclear arms control verification, for exactly the kinds of reasons you're talking about. (It's important that the machines being used can be shown to the inspectors to be working properly, and to the inspectees not to be revealing nuclear signature data outside of the immediate inspection process.)